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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyse the size and determinants of gender and ethnic earnings gaps in seven West 
African capitals (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou) based on a 
unique and perfectly comparable dataset coming from the 1-2-3 Surveys conducted in the seven cities 
from 2001 to 2002. Analysing gender and ethnic earnings gaps in an African context raises a number 
of important issues that our paper attempts to address, notably by taking into account labour allocation 
between public, private formal and informal sectors which can be expected to contribute to earnings 
gaps. Our results show that gender earnings gaps are large in all the cities of our sample and that 
gender differences in the distribution of characteristics usually explain less than half of the raw gender 
gap. By contrast, majority ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematic favourable position in the 
urban labour markets of our sample of countries and observed ethnic gaps are small relative to gender 
gaps. Whatever the “sign” of the gap, the contribution of differences in the distribution of individual 
characteristics varies markedly between cities. Taking into account differences in sectoral locations in 
the decomposition of gender earnings gaps provides evidence that within-sector differences in 
earnings account for the largest share of the gender gap and that the differences in sectoral locations 
are always more favorable to men than to women. By contrast, concerning ethnic earnings gaps, the 
full decomposition indicates that sectoral location sometimes plays a “compensating” role against 
observed earnings gaps. Looking at finer levels of ethnic disaggregation confirms that ethnic earnings 
differentials are systematically smaller that gender differentials. 
Key words: earnings equations, gender wage gap, ethnic wage gap, West Africa 
Résumé 
Dans cette étude nous analysons le poids et les déterminants des différentiels de rémunérations entre 
genre et groupes ethniques dans sept métropoles d’Afrique de l’Ouest (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
Dakar, Lomé, Niamey and Ouagadougou), en mobilisant une base de données unique et parfaitement 
comparable, provenant des enquêtes 1-2-3 réalisées dans les sept villes en 2001 et 2002. Cette 
question soulève un certain nombre de questions méthodologiques que nous tentons de traiter en 
détail, notamment en tenant compte des différences de composition ethnique et de genre entre les 
secteurs public, privé formel et informel qui sont susceptibles de jouer sur les écarts de revenus. Les 
résultats mettent en évidence l’existence d’un déficit systématique de rémunération pour les femmes, 
les caractéristiques des emplois expliquant moins de la moitié de ces écarts. A contrario, les groupes 
ethniques majoritaires ne semblent pas bénéficier d’une situation avantageuse et les écarts de revenus 
suivant le groupe ethnique sont relativement faibles par rapport à ceux que l’on observe suivant le 
genre. Quel que soit le signe de ce différentiel (positif ou négatif), la contribution expliquée par les 
caractéristiques observées de l’emploi varie très sensiblement d’une ville à l’autre. Les estimations 
montrent qu’une grande partie de l’écart de revenu selon le genre provient de l’allocation sectorielle, 
et que cette dernière est toujours défavorable aux femmes. En revanche, dans le cas des écarts suivant 
le groupe ethnique, la distribution par secteur institutionnel joue parfois de façon positive dans le sens 
d’une réduction des écarts. Finalement, une désagrégation plus fine des groupes ethniques, au-delà de 
la partition majoritaire/minoritaire, confirme que l’entrée ethnique est systématiquement moins 
significative sur les revenus du travail que le genre. 
Mots-clé : Equation de gain, écart de salaire, décomposition, genre, Ethnie, Afrique de l'Ouest 
JEL Classification: J31, J71, O15, O55 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many studies have shown that women and ethnic minorities may face unequal treatment in 
the labour markets of both developed and developing countries compared to men or 
majority ethnic groups (Altonji and Blank, 1999). In the case of Africa, there is in fact little 
known about inequalities in labour market outcomes and enhancing the gender and ethnic 
gap literature on the poorest countries is important for several reasons. First, there are 
manifest shortcomings of studies on African countries, particularly due to the shortage of 
available data (Bennell, 1996). Second, gender and ethnic inequalities are likely to be greater 
when markets do not function efficiently and the states lack resources for introducing 
corrective policies. Third, understanding the roots of inequalities between the sexes and 
ethnic groups and reducing the gender and ethnic gap could help design poverty reducing 
policies in these countries. Under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative that 
concerns over sixty of the world's poorest countries, policies designed to counter gender 
discrimination are among the recommended solutions to reduce poverty: Goal 3 of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is specifically aimed at reducing gender inequalities. 
In order to put this recommendation into practice, one needs to understand whether 
differences in labour outcomes stem from differences in characteristics or from differences in 
the returns to these characteristics. These would indeed require different sets of policies. In 
Sub-Saharan countries, the deterioration of the labour markets as well as the partial freeze on 
public sector recruitment from the mid-1980s may have accentuated the circumstances (i.e. 
labour market entry and exit) that could give rise to gender and ethnic inequalities in the 
labour market.  
 
While there is a sizeable number of papers dealing with ethnic and gender wage gap in 
developed countries (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000), we can infer from 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005)’s meta-analysis that only 3 percent of the studies 
on gender wage gap stem from African data out of all the empirical literature since the 1960s. 
The existing literature1 on gender gaps indicates that there is a wide consensus on the 
                                                 
1 See, notably, Glewwe (1990) for Ghana; Cohen and House (1993) for Sudan; Milne and Neitzert 
(1994) and Agesa (1999) for Kenya; Glick and Sahn (1997) for Guinea; Lachaud (1997) for Burkina and 
Cameroun; Armitage and Sabot (1991) for Kenya and Tanzania; Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan 
(1999) for Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia; Isemonger and Roberts (1999) for South Africa; 
Siphambe and Thokweng-Bakwena (2001) for Botswana; Kabubo-Mariara (2003) for Kenya; Temesgen 
(2006) for Ethiopia; Kolev and Suarez Robles (2007) for Ethiopia; Nordman and Roubaud (2009) and 
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importance of inequalities between men and women, both for salaried and self-employed 
workers. For instance, in Guinea, Glick and Sahn (1997) find that differences in 
characteristics account for 45 percent of the male-female gap in earnings from self-
employment and 25 percent of the differences in earnings from public-sector employment 
while, in the private sector, women actually earn more than men. Armitage and Sabot (1991) 
also find that such gender inequality exists in the public sector of Tanzania but observed no 
gender discrimination in Kenya's labour market. The latter result holds true both for the 
public and private sectors of the Kenyan economy. Similarly, Glewwe (1990) found no wage 
discrimination against women in Ghana. On the contrary, females seem better off than males 
in the public sector. More recently, Siphambe and Thokweng-Bakwena (2001) show that in 
the public sector of Botswana most of the wage gap is due to differences in characteristics 
between men and women and not to discrimination. On the other hand, in the private sector, 
most of the wage gap is due to discrimination. Likewise, in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire, 
Appleton et al. (1999) find evidence that the public sector practises less wage discrimination 
than the private sector. A similar result is obtained for Madagascar by Nordman and 
Roubaud (2009) who evidence a gender wage gap to the advantage of women in the state 
sector. From all the existing studies, one can hardly conclude on the existence of a common 
cross-country pattern in the relative magnitudes of the gender wage gaps in the public and 
private sectors. However, the main reason for this diversity in results might come from the 
great heterogeneity in the data sources used by the different authors (either labour force or 
household surveys undertaken for other purposes than labour market issues), in the period 
they consider and also in the methodology they implement.  
 
Concerning the ethnic wage gap, the literature is even scarcer. Barr and Oduro (2000) find for 
Ghana that a significant proportion of earnings differentials between ethnic groups can be 
explained by standard observed workers’ characteristics. On the other hand, the question of 
the role of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on development has received much more 
attention. For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that “Africa’s growth tragedy” is 
in part related to its high level of ethnic diversity, resulting in poor institutional functioning. 
This result is, however, still debated (see Bossuroy, 2007 for a discussion).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nordman, Rakotomanana and Robilliard (2009) for Madagascar; Nordman and Wolff (2009a) for 
Morocco and Nordman and Wolff (2009b) for the formal sectors of Madagascar and Mauritius. 
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In this paper, we cast some new light on these issues by using labour force surveys carried 
out in seven economic capitals of francophone West Africa. The contribution of this study 
stems from at least two main advantages. First, the data used were collected using identical 
sampling method and virtually identical questionnaires in each city in the same period of 
time (2001-2003), making for totally comparable results.2 Second, we analyse both gender 
and ethnic gap issues using the same methodological approach for each city. Given that 
these are the two most important individual characteristics expected to give rise to 
discrimination, we believe it is interesting to compare the magnitude of discrimination, if 
any, against females and against minority or other ethnic groups. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, concepts and 
econometric methods used. In section 3 we comment on the results. Finally, in section 4, we 
draw together the main findings and conclude. 
 
2. Data, Concepts and Methodology 
 
In this section, we first present the data and concepts used in this study before discussing the 
methodology of earnings decompositions, an essential aspect of our investigation of the 
gender and ethnic disparities in the West African labour markets.   
 
2.1. Data and concepts 
 
Our data are taken from an original series of urban household surveys in West Africa, the 1-
2-3 Surveys conducted in seven major WAEMU3 cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, 
Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou) from 2001 to 2002. The surveys were carried out by the 
relevant countries’ National Statistics Institutes (NSIs), AFRISTAT and DIAL as part of the 
PARSTAT Project.4 The surveys cover the economic city, i.e. the “administrative city” and all 
the small towns and villages directly attached to it and with which there are frequent 
exchanges. As suggested by its name, the 1-2-3 Survey is a three-phase survey. The first phase 
concerns individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics (including education and literacy) 
                                                 
2 For another comparative analysis with these data, see Kuepie et al. (2009). 
3 WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union. The survey was not carried out in Guinea-
Bissau. 
4 Regional Statistical Assistance Programme for multilateral monitoring sponsored by the WAEMU 
Commission. 
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and labour market integration. The second phase covers the informal sector and its main 
productive characteristics. The third phase focuses on household consumption and living 
conditions. The same methodology and virtually identical questionnaires were used in each 
city, making for totally comparable indicators. Our study uses only the Phase 1 data. Phase 1 
of the 1-2-3 Survey is a statistical employment survey designed to (i) provide the main 
indicators to describe the situation of individuals and households on the labour market. It 
covers household employment and economic activities, especially in the informal sector; (ii) 
serve as a filter survey to identify a representative sample of informal production units, 
which are then surveyed in Phase 2. 
 
The sample surveyed in Phase 1 has a total of 93,213 individuals (17,841 households) with 
country sample sizes varying from 9,907 individuals in Togo to 19,065 individuals in 
Senegal. All individuals are asked about their ethnic group. The groups obviously differ 
between countries: the number of groups taken into consideration in the questionnaire varies 
from 9 in Benin and Niger to 40 groups in Togo. However, in order to harmonize the data 
and the number of categories considered, the 40 Togolese groups and the 18 Ivorian groups 
were “reduced” to 6 groups. Non response appears to be the exception with only 665 missing 
or “Does not know” answers.  
 
2.2. Wage gap decomposition techniques 
 
In the following, we discuss earning equations estimations and present methods that are 
traditionally used to decompose gender wage gaps. A full decomposition method à la 
Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) is also presented. The application of these 
methods to decomposing ethnic wage gaps is then discussed. 
 
2.2.1. Earnings determination 
Traditional gender earnings decompositions rely on estimations of Mincer-type earnings 
functions for men and women of the form: 
 iii xw εβ +=ln          (1) 
where iwln  is the natural logarithm of the observed hourly earnings for individual i, ix  is a 
vector of observed characteristics, β  is a vector of coefficients and iε  is a disturbance term 
with an expected value of zero. 
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Earning functions are first estimated separately for males and females, and also for the 
different sectors. There is no universally accepted set of conditioning variables that should be 
included for describing the causes of gender labour market outcomes differentials. Yet, the 
consensus is that controls for productivity-related factors such as education, labour market 
experience and marital status should be included. However, it is debatable whether job 
characteristics, occupation and industry should be taken into account: if employers 
differentiate between men and women through their tendency to hire into certain 
occupations, then occupational assignment is an outcome of employer practices rather than 
an outcome of individual choice or productivity differences.5  
 
In this paper, it is not possible to account for the workers’ actual experience in the labour 
market, but only for potential experience which can be viewed as reflecting the ‘gross’ time 
that individuals have spent while in the labour force (measured as age minus years of 
schooling minus six – the legal age at school entry). This is a possible limitation of our study 
since, as argued in the empirical literature, differences in labour force attachment across 
gender are important to explain the extent of the gender wage gap. Indeed, measures of 
women’s work experience are particularly prone to errors given their discontinuity in labour 
market participation (for child baring and care for instance). Using proxy measures such as 
potential experience may thus lead to overestimate the amount of experience for females, 
while it might be a good approximation of true experience for men with higher labour force 
attachment (Nordman and Roubaud,2009).6  
 
Concerns arise over possible sample selection biases in the estimations. Strictly speaking, 
there are two sources of selectivity bias involved. One arises from the fact that earnings are 
only observed when people work, and not everyone is working. The second comes from the 
selective decision to engage in public wage employment rather than private wage 
employment or the informal sector. Here, we address both issues using Lee’s two-stage 
                                                 
5 Conversely, one can argue that analyses that omit occupation and industry may underestimate the 
importance of background and choice-based characteristics on labour market outcomes (Altonji and 
Blank, 1999). 
6 Regan and Oaxaca (2006) show that using potential versus actual experience in earnings models is 
best viewed as a model misspecification problem rather than a classical errors-in-variable framework. 
Instrumental variable techniques are the traditional approach taken to correct classical measurement 
error. Then, as underline Regan and Oaxaca (2006), in the absence of actual experience measures, 
instrumenting potential experience would not solve the model specification problem.  
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approach to take into account the possible effect of endogenous paid-work participation and 
sector allocation on earnings (Lee, 1983)7. In the first stage, multinomial logit models of 
individual i’s participation in sector j are used to compute the correction terms ijλ  from the 
predicted probabilities Pij. The different modalities considered in the multinomial logit are: 
non-paid work participants, public sector workers, formal private sector workers and 
informal sector workers. A potential problem is that the multinomial logit may suffer from 
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA), which in most cases is 
questionable. We performed Hausman-type tests (Hausman and McFadden, 2004) for each 
city and sector which massively provide evidence that the IIA assumption is not violated, 
with the exception of the informal sector in BamakoIn Lee’s procedure, identification is 
achieved by the inclusion of additional individual variables in the first stage selection 
equations which are omitted in the second stage earnings regressions: a set of dummies 
indicating relationship to the household head, the dependency ratio (number of non working 
age individuals divided by the total number of individuals in the household), and the 
household size.8 Our assumption is that these variables have arguably no reason to influence 
earning levels.  
 
2.2.2. Oaxaca and Neumark’s traditional earnings decompositions 
The most common approach to identifying sources of gender wage gaps is the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition. In this approach, two separate standard Mincerian log earnings 
equations are estimated for males and females. The Oaxaca decomposition is: 
 ffmfmmfm xxxww )()(lnln βββ −+−=−         (2) 
where mw  and fw  are the means of males and females’ earnings, respectively; mx  and fx  
are vectors containing the respective means of the independent variables for males and 
females; and mβ  and fβ  are the estimated coefficients. The first term on the right hand side 
captures the earnings differential due to different characteristics of males and females. The 
                                                 
7 Following Tunali (1986), an alternative approach would be to employ a sequential selection rule 
(nested multinomial logit) rather than a combined one. This means controlling for self-selection into 
the paid-work group and then different endogenous choices between the public, formal private and 
informal sectors. This technique requires finding a least one variable affecting the decision to enter the 
paid-work group but not the sector choice in order to achieve identification via the use of restriction 
exclusion. Unfortunately, in our data, it seems impossible to find variables that may be used in the 
first stage selection equation and arguably be excluded from a second selection equation of sector 
allocation. 
8 Similarly, in the same context of a two-step sectoral selection correction, Appleton et al. (1999) use 
the proportion of children in the household as an identifying instrument.  
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second term is the earnings gap attributable to different returns to those characteristics or 
coefficients.  
 
It can be argued that, under discrimination, males are paid competitive wages but females 
are underpaid. If this is the case, the male coefficients should be taken as the non-
discriminatory wage structure, as in equation (2). Conversely, if employers pay females 
competitive wages but pay males more (nepotism), then the female coefficients should be 
used as the non-discriminatory wage structure. Therefore, the issue is how to determine the 
wage structure *β  that would prevail in the absence of discrimination. This choice poses the 
well-known index number problem given that we could use either the male or the female 
wage structure as the non-discriminatory benchmark. While a priori there is no preferable 
alternative, the decomposition can be quite sensitive to the selection made. The literature has 
proposed different weighting schemes to deal with the underlying index problem. In this 
paper, we rely on the general decomposition proposed by Neumark (1988) which can be 
written as follows: 
 ])()[()(lnln *** ffmmfmfm xxxxww βββββ −+−+−=−    (3) 
This decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca’s two special cases if it is assumed that there is 
no discrimination in the male wage structure, i.e. mββ =* , or if it is assumed that fββ =* . 
Neumark shows that *β  can be estimated using the weighted average of the wage structures 
of males and females and advocates using the pooled sample to estimate *β . The first term is 
the gender wage gap attributable to differences in characteristics. The second and the third 
terms capture the difference between the actual and pooled returns for men and women, 
respectively.  
 
2.2.3 Earnings decompositions with sample selectivity 
Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) show that sample selection complicates the interpretation of 
earnings decompositions. They offer several alternative decompositions, each based on 
different assumptions and objectives. We use one of them that consist in considering 
selectivity as a separate component. This technique has the advantage of not calling for any 
prior hypothesis regarding the links between individual characteristics and selectivity. An 
additional term in the decomposition measures the contribution of selection effects to the 
observed gender earnings gap, ffmm λθλθ ˆˆˆˆ − , where λˆ  and θˆ  denote respectively the mean 
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correction term (generalised Mill’s ratio) and its estimated coefficient from each regression 
by sex. Hence, in the full sectoral decomposition that follows, when trying to account for 
sample selectivity, we will consider the decomposition of offered earnings instead of actual 
earnings, i.e. earnings net of the selection effects λθ ˆˆ  (see Reimer, 1983). 
 
2.2.4. A full sectoral decomposition 
While the improvement proposed by Neumark’s decomposition is attractive, it is not 
immune from common criticisms of decomposition methods in general. One of them is that, 
without evidence that employers care only about the proportion of each type of labour 
employed, it is not clear that the pooled coefficient is a good estimator of the non-
discriminatory wage structure. Appleton et al. (1999)’s full sectoral decomposition takes into 
account sectoral structures differences between genders by using a similar approach to that 
of Neumark and decomposing the gender earnings gap into three components.  
 
Let mW  and fW  be the means of the natural logs of male and female earnings and mjp  and 
fjp  be the sample proportions of men and women in sector j respectively. Male and female 
mean earnings can be written as the sum of sectoral earnings weighted by the proportion of 
workers in each sector :  
  ∑
=
=
3
1j
mjmjm pWW
  
∑
=
=
3
1j
fjfjf pWW  
As a result, one can decompose the difference in mean earnings into intrasectoral earnings 
differences and differences in proportions employed in the different sectors. In order to 
overcome the index problem, Appleton et al. (1999) assume a sectoral structure that would 
prevail in the absence of gender differences in the impact of characteristics on sectoral choice. 
Let *jp  be the proportion of workers in sector j under this assumption. They then decompose 
the difference in mean earnings such as: 
 ∑ ∑∑
= ==
−+−+−=−
3
1
3
1
*
3
1
** )()()(
j j
fjjfj
j
jmjmjfjmjjfm ppWppWWWpWW   
 (4) 
The first term can be decomposed using the Neumark decomposition presented earlier. The 
second and third terms can further be decomposed in order to set apart differences arising 
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from differences in observable characteristics and differences arising from differences in 
returns to observable characteristics. In order to do so, one can derive the average probability 
to be employed in a given sector for male and female workers from the estimation of pooled 
and separate multinomial logit models for men and women. These mean probabilities are 
denoted by *mjp  and 
*
fjp respectively. Embedding the self-selection process in (4), the full 
decomposition can then be written in the following way: 
. )()()()(              
)()()(
3
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1
3
1
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(5) 
The first three terms are similar to Neumark decompositions of within-sector earnings gaps. 
The fourth and fifth terms measure the difference in earnings due to differences in 
distribution of male and female workers in different sectors. The last two terms account for 
differences in earnings resulting from the deviations between predicted and actual sectoral 
compositions of men and women not accounted for by differences in characteristics.  
 
2.2.5. Earnings gap decomposition for ethnic groups 
Extending decomposition methods developed and traditionally used to analyse possible 
discrimination against women to the study of earnings differentials between ethnic groups is 
not straightforward. One of the main problems is related to the definition and measurement 
of ethnicity: what defines an ethnic group? In developed countries, there exist conflicting 
views and different traditions regarding the collection of data on ethnic origin: while Anglo-
Saxon societies are used to measuring and analysing data on so-called racial or ethnic 
groups, a number of countries refuse to categorize individuals using ethnic or racial criteria9 
and, as a result, do not collect statistical data on ethnic origin. In Africa, the notion of 
ethnicity also raises a number of questions that have been extensively debated among social 
scientists (see for instance Bayart, 1989). Works by anthropologists have indeed shown that, 
contrary to a naïve a priori, ethnic groups are not characterized by the genetic homogeneity of 
their members. Depending on countries and contexts, the constitution of ethnic groups 
appears to be more or less recent and their definition is moving. While some groups have 
their origin in a common myth and/or ancestor, others only share a common language and 
culture, and some have been constructed from “outside”, i.e. by other groups, either upon a 
                                                 
9 In France, the collection of data on ethnic origin is subject to the authorization of a government body 
and is not granted systematically. Recently, a survey designed to study racial discrimination in the 
labour market gave rise to a strong opposition from French public opinion. 
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migration or invasion event, or through an exogenous categorization constructed and 
imposed by colonial rulers. Despite their various origins, it is widely admitted that the 
notion of ethnicity plays a certain role in the social relations of many African countries. There 
is, for instance, strong evidence of high levels of endogamy, not only in rural areas where 
ethnic homogeneity is often observed at the local level, but also in urban areas where 
different ethnic groups usually cohabit. In the past ten years, economists have seized the 
“ethnic” issue around the question of its impact on development and growth. The seminal 
paper is Easterly and Levine’s contribution (1997) that concludes that “Africa’s growth 
tragedy” is in part related to its high level of ethnic diversity, resulting in poor institutional 
functioning. However, this result is still debated nowadays (see Bossuroy, 2007 for a 
discussion). 
 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of ethnicity on labour market outcomes measured 
through earnings. In order to apply the methods developed for the analysis of the gender 
earnings gap, one is inclined to construct a dichotomous variable identifying either a 
possibly favoured or discriminated against ethnic group. Data collection on ethnicity at the 
household or individual level is common in Africa: most household and employment 
surveys include a variable indicating the ethnic group. However, given the diversity of 
national contexts, two difficulties arise: the first one is related to identifying a priori a 
discriminated ethnic group: should one consider the majority ethnic group as favoured? Or 
should one consider instead the group related to the head of state? The second difficulty 
arises because of our comparative framework: how does belonging to the different groups 
compare across countries? For instance, if one considers majority ethnic groups in the cities 
of the 1-2-3 Surveys, is it the same to be a Mossi in Ouagadougou (76.6 percent of the 
population) and a Bambara in Bamako (34.0 percent of the population)? Although we do not 
attempt to answer this question in the paper, we try to consider various aspects of possible 
ethnic discrimination on urban labour markets while keeping in mind the different national 
contexts. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1. A Neumark decomposition of gender and ethnic earnings gaps 
 
In this section, gender and ethnic earnings gaps are analysed using traditional 
decomposition approaches. As mentioned earlier, in order to apply these methods to 
decompose the ethnic earnings gap, one is inclined to construct a dichotomous variable 
identifying either a possibly favoured or discriminated against ethnic group. For that 
purpose, we identify a majority ethnic group in each city. Descriptive statistics indicate that 
these majority ethnic groups represent an absolute majority of the capital’s population in 
three countries out of seven.10 More precisely: 
 - the Fon represent 60.9 percent of the population of Cotonou (Benin);  
 - the Mossi represent 78.2 percent of the population in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso);  
 - the Akan represent 34.2 percent of the population in Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire);  
 - the Bambara represent 34.4 percent of the population of Bamako (Mali);  
 - the Djerma represent 49.5 percent of the population of Niamey (Niger); 
 - the Wolof represent 40.4 percent of the population of Dakar (Senegal); 
 - the Ewe-Mina-Wachi represent 74.2 percent of the population of Lome (Togo). 
In six cities out of seven, the majority ethnic group corresponds to the majority group at the 
national level. The only exception is Niger where the majority ethnic group in the capital is 
the Djerma while it is the Haoussa at the national level (54 percent of the population). 
 
A first look at earnings gap decompositions based on gender and majority ethnic groups is 
provided in Table 1 which reports a decomposition of earnings gaps based on Neumark’s 
approach (see section 2.2.2). A number of results are worth emphasizing. 
Raw gender earnings gaps are large, significant and vary from 50.0 in Niamey to 79.2 in 
Abidjan: these figures indicate that females in Niamey (resp. in Abidjan) earn on average 
50.0 percent (respectively 20.8 percent) of male earnings. 
Gender differences in the distribution of characteristics related to productivity – such as 
education and experience – usually explain less than half of the raw gender gap in six cities 
out of seven: Lome is an exception with differences in characteristics explaining almost 55 
percent of the gap. Including variables related to the type of occupation decreases somewhat 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 1 for more details on the majority ethnic group in each country. 
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the unexplained share of the raw gender gap. This decrease appears to be substantial in 
Ouagadougou, Abidjan and Lome. 
Contrary to the systematic favourable position of men with respect to women, majority 
ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematic favourable position in the urban labour 
markets of our sample of countries. It is only in Abidjan and Dakar that the gap appears both 
significant and favourable for the majority ethnic group: in Abidjan, the Akan earn on 
average 28.0 percent more than other ethnic groups while in Dakar, the Wolof earn on 
average 6.8 percent more than other ethnic groups; on the contrary, majority ethnic groups in 
Ouagadougou, Bamako and Lome earn significantly less on average than other ethnic 
groups. 
Concerning the decomposition of ethnic earnings gaps, results differ markedly. In Abidjan, 
the results indicate that differences in the distribution of individual characteristics explain 
more than 85 percent of the gap so that little is left for what could be labelled discrimination 
(the unexplained share) against non majority ethnic groups. In Dakar, on the contrary, 100% 
of the gap is left unexplained until job characteristics related to occupation and sector are 
introduced. In Ouagadougou, where the majority ethnic group (Mossi) receives lower 
earnings than other groups, the gap is also in large part explained by differences in the 
distribution of observable characteristics such as education and experience; as a result, the 
unexplained share is low at 20.0 percent; in Bamako, the unexplained share of the gap 
against the majority ethnic group (Bambara) is much higher: there, differences in returns to 
characteristics account for 43.4 percent of the gap (down to 39 percent once occupation status 
dummies are included in the regressions). 
 
3.2. A full decomposition of the gender earnings gap 
 
It is widely acknowledged that there are at least four types of labour markets in most 
developing countries: rural (or agricultural), public, formal private and informal. These 
markets each have their own characteristics, such as job seasonality, uncertainty of demand, 
nature of contracts and structure of wages and earnings. As a result, gender and ethnic 
labour allocation between these sectors can be expected to contribute to earnings gaps. 
Following Appleton et al. (1999) and Nordman and Roubaud (2009), we provide comparable 
estimates of the size and determinants of gender earnings gaps using the decomposition 
method described in section 2.2.4. Given that we are analysing urban labour markets, only 
three types of labour markets are taken into consideration: public, formal private and 
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informal. Results are reported in Tables 2 and 3, without and with correction for selectivity of 
participation and sectoral allocation (see section 2.2.3).  
Within-sector differences in earnings account for the largest share of the gender gap with 
contributions ranging from 60.2 percent in Abidjan to 74.8 percent in Cotonou. The 
remainder can then be attributed to gender differences in proportions of workers in each 
sector. The positive sum of these three terms for all cities implies that the differences in 
sectoral locations are more favourable to men than to women. For instance, the gender 
earnings gap would have been 40 percent smaller respectively in Abidjan if men and women 
had been equally distributed across the three sectors. This is because fewer women than men 
are located in the higher paying sectors such as the public and private formal sectors.  
Differences attributable to characteristics only account for a relatively small share of the 
within-sector differences in earnings: their contribution varies from 10 percent in Dakar to 41 
percent in Lome (as a share of the contribution of within-sector differences; not shown in the 
table). Conversely, differences attributable to characteristics account for a very large share of 
the sectoral location differences between genders: their contribution varies from 65 percent in 
Dakar to 85 percent in Cotonou and Bamako.  
Concerning differences attributable to deviation in male and female returns, their 
contribution to within-sector differences in earnings are of the same order, indicating that 
both “discrimination” against women and “nepotism” in favour of men contribute to the 
gender earnings gap; both “discrimination” against women and “nepotism” in favour of 
men also contribute to differences in sectoral location but at a much lower level. 
 
Taking into account selectivity leads to analysing the decomposition not of actual earnings 
but of offered earnings. These are computed using the coefficients of the selection term in the 
earnings equations (see section 2.2.3). Results in Table 3 show that offered earnings gaps are 
much higher in Cotonou, Bamako and Dakar, while they are lower in the other cities. Higher 
earnings gaps when sectoral selectivity is accounted for are not systematically associated 
with higher contribution of sectoral location differences however. Except in Niamey, within-
sector earnings differences remain the main contributor to gender gaps. 
 
Concerning ethnic earnings gaps, our results in Table 4 (without correcting for selectivity) 
indicate that: In Ouagadougou the gap can almost evenly be attributed to within-sector 
earning difference (46.7%) and to sectoral location (53.2%). In Abidjan, it is differences in 
sectoral location that explain the highest share of the gap (86.1 percent) of which 75 percent 
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are accounted for by differences in characteristics. In Bamako, within-sector differences in 
earnings account for 77.4 percent of the earnings gap out of which 33.3 percent are 
attributable to differences in characteristics; both “nepotism” (15.9 percent) and 
“discrimination” (28.2 percent) significantly contribute to the gap through their contribution 
to within-sector differences in earnings. On the contrary, sectoral location differences are 
almost entirely explained by differences in characteristics. In Lome, the gap is also explained 
by sectoral location differences but, contrary to Bamako, the deviation in the effect of 
characteristics on location explains a big share of sectoral location differences. Contrary to 
the results obtained for gender, where sectoral location systematically increases the gap 
“against” women, it is in some cities the case that sectoral location plays a “compensating” 
role against observed earnings gaps. 
 
Results reported in Table 5 show that taking into account selectivity leads to reassessing 
some measures of the gaps. The gap decreases for Ouagadougou, Abidjan and Dakar and 
increases for Bamako. For these cities, the decomposition results appear however relatively 
stable. In Lome, the gap is actually reversed, a possible indication that the majority ethnic 
group is offered on average higher earnings than the other ethnic groups. This result is 
somewhat puzzling and would require further investigation. For instance, in order to 
understand the features of earnings negotiations, one would need to know the ethnic group 
of the employer. 
 
3.3. Ethnic earnings differentials 
 
In this section, we examine earnings differentials between ethnic groups. As mentioned 
earlier, several ethnic groups can be differentiated in each capital. The highest number of 
groups is in Bamako (11 groups), followed by Ouagadougou (10 groups), Cotonou, Niamey 
and Dakar (9 groups) and Abidjan and Lome (6 groups).  Figure 1 reports two Herfindhal’s 
concentration indices for ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) in each country: the first one 
is computed at the national level while the second is computed at the level of capitals using 
the 1-2-3 Surveys. Levels are similar across countries except for Burkina Faso where the ELF 
index appears to be much lower in the capital than at the country level. This could stem from 
the fact that the ethnic majority group (Mossi) represents 78.2 percent of the population in 
Ouagadougou and only 50 percent at the national level. This points to a factor that can 
explain why majority ethnic groups are not systematically favoured in the labour markets of 
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our sample: indeed, in the case of Burkina, where Mossi have lower average earnings than 
other ethnic groups, it could be the case that only the better performing non-Mossi actually 
“migrate” to the capital. This is consistent with the results of the Neumark decomposition of 
the ethnic earnings gap in section 3.1. where we find that the gap “against” the Mossi is 
mainly explained by differences in characteristics. 
 
Coefficients of the dummies indicating each ethnic group in city-level earnings equations 
regressions are reported in Table 6a. In the first column, ethnic group dummies are the only 
regressors while a set of usual controls is introduced in the specification reported in the 
second column (coefficients for these variables are reported in Table 6b). Results show two 
things: first, there is at least one significant coefficient on ethnic dummies in all the cities of 
the sample meaning that there exist differences in average earnings between ethnic groups. 
However, most of these differences diminish and, in some cases, vanish once other 
observables characteristics are controlled for. In the case of Cotonou, both the Dendi people 
and the Yoruba appear favoured ceteris paribus with respect to the majority ethnic group 
(Fon), while the Yoa have lower earnings ceteris paribus than the Fon. In Ouagadougou, the 
group of “other mandingues” as well as the Senoufo people are favoured ceteris paribus 
compared to the Mossi. In Abidjan, both the Volta people and the natives from Burkina Faso 
have lower earnings ceteris paribus than the majority ethnic group (Akan). In Bamako, both 
the Peul and the Sarakole are favoured with respect to the majority ethnic group (Bambara). 
In Niamey, once control variables are included, only the Haoussa appear less favoured 
compared to the Djerma. In Dakar, both the Serere and Diola people have lower earnings 
ceteris paribus than the Wolof.11 
 
Overall majority ethnic groups seem not be favoured on the labour market once one controls 
for productivity related individual characteristics. On the contrary, some minority groups 
actually have higher earnings ceteris paribus. This is the case in Benin, Burkina, and Mali. 
However, none of the favoured groups seem to be related to the ethnicity of the head of state 
at the time of the survey.12  
 
                                                 
11 Despite the fact that some earnings differentials hold ceteris paribus, one should note that in some cases, the 
groups considered represent very small shares of the population (see Appendix 2). Consequently, the question of 
the size of our samples for analysing the characteristics of these groups can be raised. This is one of the reasons 
why we did not implement decomposition methods at this level of ethnic disaggregation. 
12 Head of state ethnicity at the time of the survey is provided in the dataset put together by Fearon, Kasara and 
Laitin (2007). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyse the size and determinants of gender and ethnic earnings gaps in 
seven West African capitals. The study is based on a unique dataset taken from an original 
series of urban household surveys in West Africa, the 1-2-3 Surveys conducted in seven major 
WAEMU cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou) from 
2001 to 2002. Analysing gender and ethnic earnings gaps in an African context raises a 
number of important issues that our paper attempts to address. 
 
First, international comparisons of earnings gaps are still scarce in Africa. Our surveys use 
identical methodologies and virtually identical questionnaires in each city, making for totally 
comparable results. Second, we address the issue of sample selectivity due to endogenous 
sector choices (public, private formal and informal sectors) as gender and ethnic labour 
allocation between these sectors can be expected to contribute to earnings gaps. Following 
Appleton et al. (1999), we then provide comparable estimates of the size and determinants of 
gender and ethnic earnings gaps using decomposition methods that address the sectoral 
allocation issue. 
 
The results show that gender earnings gaps are large in all the cities of our sample and that 
gender differences in the distribution of characteristics usually explain less than half of the 
raw gender gap. By contrast, majority ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematic 
favourable position in the urban labour markets of our sample of countries and observed 
gaps are small relative to gender gaps. Moreover, none of the minority “favoured” groups 
seem to be related to the ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey. 
 
Whatever the “sign” of the gap, the contribution of differences in the distribution of 
individual characteristics varies markedly between cities. Taking into account differences in 
sectoral locations in the decomposition of gender earnings gaps provides evidence that 
within-sector differences in earnings account for the largest share of the gender gap and that 
the differences in sectoral locations are always more favourable to men than to women. By 
contrast, concerning ethnic earnings gaps, the full decomposition indicates that sectoral 
location sometimes plays a “compensating” role against observed earnings gaps. Looking at 
finer levels of ethnic disaggregation confirms that ethnic earnings differentials are 
systematically smaller that gender differentials. 
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Figure 1: Herfindhal concentration indices of Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
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Source: Fearon (2003) and PARSTAT 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations.  
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Table 1: Neumark decompositions of gender and ethnic earnings gaps 
  Without Occupation or Sector Dummies With Occupation Dummies With Occupation and Sector Dummies 
 
Raw 
Earnings 
Gap 
Explained Unexpl. Unexpl. (%) Explained Unexpl. Unexpl. (%) Explained Unexpl. Unexpl. (%) 
Gender earnings gaps           
Cotonou  0.779*** 0.339 0.439 56.4 0.355 0.423 54.3 0.361 0.418 53.7 
Ouagadougou  0.754*** 0.248 0.506 67.1 0.305 0.449 59.5 0.305 0.448 59.5 
Abidjan  0.792*** 0.337 0.455 57.4 0.396 0.396 50.0 0.420 0.372 47.0 
Bamako  0.736*** 0.301 0.435 59.2 0.283 0.452 61.5 0.306 0.430 58.4 
Niamey  0.500*** 0.196 0.304 60.9 0.197 0.303 60.6 0.195 0.305 61.0 
Dakar  0.556*** 0.194 0.361 65.0 0.203 0.353 63.5 0.246 0.309 55.7 
Lome 0.787*** 0.427 0.360 45.7 0.481 0.306 38.9 0.482 0.305 38.7 
Ethnic earnings gaps           
Cotonou  -0.015 0.040 -0.055 369.7 0.048 -0.062 421.5 0.050 -0.065 441.1 
Ouagadougou  -0.537*** -0.430 -0.107 20.0 -0.463 -0.074 13.8 -0.461 -0.076 14.2 
Abidjan  0.279*** 0.225 0.054 19.4 0.253 0.027 9.5 0.255 0.025 8.8 
Bamako  -0.182*** -0.103 -0.079 43.4 -0.109 -0.073 40.1 -0.111 -0.071 39.0 
Niamey  0.019 -0.034 0.053 278.8 -0.022 0.041 216.8 -0.024 0.043 226.7 
Dakar  0.068** -0.001 0.069 101.9 0.024 0.044 65.2 0.022 0.046 68.1 
Lome -0.113*** -0.055 -0.059 51.7 -0.066 -0.047 41.3 -0.081 -0.032 28.3 
Source: PARSTAT 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations.  
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.          
Raw Gender Earnings Gaps are positive by construction because they are computed as the difference between a “high group” and a “low group”. In our sample of countries, 
females always correspond to the “low group”. This is not the case for the majority ethnic group which corresponds to the “high group” in Abidjan, Niamey and Dakar and to 
the “low group” in Cotonou, Ouagadougou, Bamako and Lome. This explains why gaps are negative for these last four cities. 
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Table 2: Full decomposition of the gender earnings gap without correcting for selectivity 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé 
Actual earnings gap 0.779 % 0.754 % 0.792 % 0.736 % 0.500 % 0.556 % 0.787 % 
= Log(Male earn.) – Log(Female earn.) ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  
Difference due to within-sector differences in earnings attributable to:           
Characteristics 0.166 21.3 0.092 12.3 0.099 12.5 0.133 18.1 0.060 12.1 0.043 7.7 0.240 30.5 
Deviation in male returns 0.238 30.6 0.210 27.9 0.192 24.3 0.199 27.0 0.110 22.1 0.143 25.8 0.191 24.2 
Deviation in female returns 0.178 22.9 0.250 33.1 0.185 23.4 0.209 28.4 0.164 32.7 0.161 28.9 0.122 15.5 
Sub-total 0.582 74.8 0.552 73.3 0.476 60.2 0.541 73.5 0.334 66.9 0.347 62.4 0.553 70.2 
Difference due to differences between sectoral location attributable to:           
Characteristics 0.167 21.4 0.170 22.5 0.245 30.9 0.165 22.4 0.126 25.1 0.136 24.4 0.182 23.2 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on male location 0.010 1.3 0.010 1.3 0.022 2.7 0.009 1.3 0.012 2.5 0.028 5.0 0.018 2.3 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on female location 0.020 2.5 0.023 3.0 0.049 6.2 0.021 2.8 0.027 5.5 0.045 8.2 0.033 4.2 
Sub-total 0.197 25.2 0.203 26.8 0.316 39.8 0.195 26.5 0.165 33.1 0.209 37.6 0.233 29.7 
Source: PARSTAT 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations.  
 
 
Table 3: Full decomposition of the gender earnings gap accounting for selectivity 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé 
Offered earnings gap 1.060 % 1.237 % 0.970 % 2.050 % 0.885 % 1.361 % 0.857 % 
= Log(Male earn.) – Log(Female earn.) ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  
Difference due to within-sector differences in earnings attributable to:           
Characteristics 0.205 19.3 0.144 11.7 0.107 11.1 0.198 9.7 0.074 8.4 0.053 3.9 0.250 29.2 
Deviation in male returns 0.343 32.3 0.423 34.2 0.204 21.0 0.729 35.6 0.245 27.6 0.408 30.0 0.163 19.0 
Deviation in female returns 0.334 31.5 0.490 39.6 0.235 24.2 0.956 46.6 0.355 40.2 0.547 40.2 0.009 1.0 
Sub-total 0.882 83.1 1.057 85.5 0.546 56.3 1.883 91.9 0.674 76.2 1.008 74.1 0.422 49.2 
Difference due to differences between sectoral location attributable to:           
Characteristics 0.154 14.5 0.151 12.2 0.319 32.9 0.150 7.3 0.162 18.3 0.212 15.6 0.331 38.6 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on male location 0.012 1.1 0.004 0.3 0.042 4.4 0.015 0.7 0.013 1.5 0.065 4.8 0.032 3.8 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on female location 0.013 1.3 0.024 2.0 0.062 6.4 0.002 0.1 0.036 4.1 0.076 5.6 0.072 8.4 
Sub-total 0.179 16.9 0.179 14.5 0.423 43.7 0.167 8.1 0.211 23.9 0.353 26.0 0.435 50.8 
Source: PARSTAT 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations.  
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Table 4: Full decomposition of the ethnic earnings gap without correcting for selectivity 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé 
Actual earnings gap -0.015 % -0.537 % 0.279 % -0.182 % 0.019 % 0.068 % -0.113 % 
= Log(Maj. groups earn.) – Log(Min. group earn.)   ***  ***  ***    **  ***  
Difference due to within-sector differences in earnings attributable to:          
Characteristics 0.014 -96.0 -0.156 29.0 0.004 1.5 -0.061 33.3 -0.049 -258.9 0.021 31.6 0.009 -8.0 
Deviation in maj. group returns -0.039 262.9 -0.076 14.2 0.011 3.9 -0.029 15.9 0.019 102.8 0.034 49.9 -0.023 19.9 
Deviation in maj. group returns -0.027 179.3 -0.019 3.5 0.024 8.5 -0.051 28.2 0.024 125.1 0.051 75.3 -0.009 7.8 
Sub-total -0.052 346.2 -0.251 46.7 0.039 13.9 -0.141 77.4 -0.006 -31.0 0.106 156.8 -0.023 19.7 
Difference due to differences between sectoral location attributable to:          
Characteristics 0.018 -120.0 -0.250 46.5 0.181 64.7 -0.050 27.4 -0.008 -41.8 -0.009 -13.7 -0.015 13.2 
Deviation in effect of char. on maj. group location 0.012 -78.1 -0.028 5.2 0.017 5.9 0.003 -1.7 0.017 88.0 -0.012 -17.0 -0.053 47.2 
Deviation in effect of char. on min. group location 0.007 -48.2 -0.008 1.5 0.043 15.5 0.006 -3.1 0.016 84.9 -0.018 -26.0 -0.022 19.8 
Sub-total 0.037 -246.3 -0.286 53.2 0.241 86.1 -0.041 22.6 0.025 131.1 -0.039 -56.7 -0.090 80.2 
Source: PARSTAT 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations.  
 
Table 5: Full decomposition of the ethnic earnings gap accounting for selectivity 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé 
Offered earnings gap 0.021 % -0.403 % 0.254 % -0.224 % -0.003 % 0.048 % 0.127 % 
= Log(Maj. groups earn.) – Log(Min. group earn.)   ***  ***  ***      ***  
Difference due to within-sector differences in earnings attributable to:            
Characteristics 0.013 64.1 -0.091 22.7 0.020 -7.8 -0.042 18.8 -0.043 1335.8 0.022 45.9 0.021 16.6 
Deviation in maj. group returns -0.036 -169.6 -0.029 7.1 0.016 -6.3 -0.042 18.5 0.000 14.2 0.020 42.5 0.110 86.9 
Deviation in maj. group returns -0.024 -113.4 0.021 -5.1 0.001 -0.4 -0.078 34.6 -0.012 376.7 0.042 88.3 0.090 70.8 
Sub-total -0.047 -218.9 -0.099 24.7 0.037 -14.5 -0.162 71.9 -0.055 1726.7 0.084 176.7 0.221 174.3 
Difference due to differences between sectoral location attributable to:            
Characteristics 0.029 140.8 -0.266 66.1 0.213 84.2 -0.080 35.8 -0.016 492.6 -0.009 -19.0 -0.010 -7.9 
Deviation in effect of char. on maj. group location 0.023 109.6 -0.028 6.9 0.027 10.6 0.004 -2.0 0.025 -770.0 -0.007 -15.2 -0.030 -23.5 
Deviation in effect of char. on min. group location 0.014 68.6 -0.010 2.4 0.050 19.8 0.013 -5.7 0.043 -1349.2 -0.020 -42.5 -0.055 -42.9 
Sub-total 0.066 319.0 -0.304 75.4 0.290 114.6 -0.063 28.1 0.052 -1626.6 -0.036 -76.7 -0.095 -74.3 
Source: PARSTAT 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations.  
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Table 6a: Ethnic Earnings Differentials 
Cotonou  Raw OLS  Abidjan Raw OLS  Niamey Raw OLS  Lome Raw OLS 
Fon ref. ref.  Akan ref. ref.  Djerma ref. ref.  Ewe-Mina-Wachi ref. ref. 
Adja -0.077 0.035  Krou 0.020 -0.025  Haoussa -0.004 -0.068  Akposso-Akebou 0.121 -0.003 
 (0.039)* (0.031)   (0.061) (0.045)   (0.044) (0.035)*   (0.136) (0.111) 
Dendi 0.373 0.467  Mande N -0.268 -0.013  Peul 0.167 0.041  Ana-Ife 0.126 0.005 
 (0.135)*** (0.107)***   (0.054)*** (0.042)   (0.083)** (0.065)   (0.107) (0.087) 
Yoa -0.498 -0.213  Mande S -0.112 -0.035  Touareg -0.237 -0.102  Kabye-Tem 0.058 0.001 
 (0.147)*** (0.116)*   (0.090) (0.067)   (0.089)*** (0.070)   (0.055) (0.045) 
Yoruba 0.193 0.102  Volta -0.300 -0.086  Gourma 0.542 0.240  Para-Gourma-Akan 0.068 0.028 
 (0.051)*** (0.040)**   (0.069)*** (0.052)*   (0.285)* (0.223)   (0.092) (0.075) 
Other 0.033 0.009  Native of -0.414 -0.124  Other -0.143 -0.046  Other Togolese -0.042 0.062 
 (0.062) (0.049)       Burkina (0.045)*** (0.037)***   (0.075)* (0.059)   (0.191) (0.156) 
    Missing -0.333 0.084  Missing -0.259 -0.075  Other Non 0.297 0.276 
Ouagadougou Raw OLS   (0.250) (0.186)   (0.199) (0.156)       Togolese (0.081)*** (0.066)*** 
Mossi ref. ref.             
Bissa 0.379 0.093  Bamako Raw OLS  Dakar Raw OLS  Standard errors in parentheses 
 (0.095)*** (0.070)  Bambara ref. ref.  Wolof ref. ref.  * significant at 10%   
Bobo 0.561 0.168  Malinke 0.057 0.039  Lebou 0.032 0.034  ** significant at 5%    
 (0.165)*** (0.120)   (0.052) (0.043)   (0.063) (0.050)  *** significant at 1%   
Other Manding 0.555 0.136  Peul 0.220 0.081  Serere -0.271 -0.190     
 (0.092)*** (0.068)**   (0.054)*** (0.044)*   (0.046)*** (0.036)***     
Dagari 0.474 0.083  Sarakole 0.245 0.182  Diola -0.088 -0.103     
 (0.155)*** (0.113)   (0.060)*** (0.049)***   (0.068) (0.054)*     
Gourmantche 0.781 0.197  Songhai 0.436 0.110  Manding 0.009 -0.020     
 (0.178)*** (0.130)   (0.104)*** (0.085)   (0.081) (0.064)     
Gourounsi 0.613 0.073  Dogon -0.042 0.009  Sarakole 0.117 -0.054     
 (0.099)*** (0.073)   (0.091) (0.074)   (0.101) (0.080)     
Senoufo 1.335 0.370  Bobo 0.006 -0.069  Mandjag -0.073 -0.005     
 (0.203)*** (0.149)**   (0.107) (0.087)   (0.102) (0.081)     
Peul 0.552 0.161  Senoufo 0.398 0.051  Peul -0.016 -0.032     
 (0.137)*** (0.100)   (0.093)*** (0.077)   (0.044) (0.035)     
Other 0.498 0.109  Arab 0.450 0.078  Missing 0.075 -0.024     
 (0.117)*** (0.086)   (0.149)*** (0.122)   (0.065) (0.052)     
Missing -0.141 -0.130  Haoussa 0.303 0.126         
 (0.209) (0.152)   (0.102)*** (0.083)         
    Missing 0.109 0.126         
     (0.115) (0.094)         
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Table 6b: Ethnic Earnings Differentials – Control Variables 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lome 
Women = 1 -0.495 -0.525 -0.507 -0.464 -0.314 -0.370 -0.425 
 (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.025)*** (0.033)*** 
Education 0.046 0.100 0.028 0.045 0.077 0.066 0.030 
 (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** 
Education2 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Potential experience 0.038 0.067 0.051 0.062 0.052 0.066 0.052 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Potential experience2 -0.039 -0.073 -0.049 -0.065 -0.047 -0.073 -0.057 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** 
Maried = 1 0.043 0.160 0.120 0.093 0.067 0.059 0.032 
 (0.026)* (0.031)*** (0.029)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)** (0.028)** (0.032) 
Constant -2.725 -3.549 -2.568 -3.013 -3.086 -2.769 -3.311 
 (0.060)*** (0.061)*** (0.066)*** (0.063)*** (0.069)*** (0.053)*** (0.070)*** 
Observations 4209 3774 4060 3928 3295 4929 3600 
R-squared 0.39 0.50 0.47 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.34 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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Appendix 1: Ethnicity in West African countries (1-2-3 Surveys) 
Country Majority Ethnic Group in the PARSTAT sample Soviet 
Atlas ELF 
PARSTAT 
ELF 
Benin 
 
Fon is a major West African ethnic and linguistic group in the country of Benin or Dahomey, and southwest Nigeria, made up of 
more than 2,000,000 people. The Fon language is the main language spoken in Southern Benin, and is a member of the Gbe 
language group. Closely related cultures include the Ewe, Adja and Guin peoples. The Fon are said to originate from Tado, a 
village in south east Togo, near the border with Benin. 
0.6182 0.5742 
Burkina Mossi (sing. Moaaga) are a people in central Burkina Faso, living mostly in the villages of the Volta River Basin. The Mossi are the 
largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso, constituting 40% of the population, or about 6.2 million people. The other 60% of Burkino 
Faso's population is composed of more than 60 ethnic groups, mainly the Gurunsi, Senufo, Lobi, Bobo, and Fulani. The Mossi 
speak the More language. 
0.6783 0.3814 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
The Akan people are a linguistic group of West Africa. This group includes the Akuapem, the Akyem, the Ashanti, the Baoulé, the 
Anyi, the Brong, the Fante and the Nzema peoples of both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.  
0.8593 0.8204 
Mali The Bambara (Bamana in their own language, or sometimes Banmana) are a Mande people living in west Africa, primarily in Mali 
but also in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Senegal. They are considered to be amongst the largest Mande ethnic groups, and are the 
dominant Mande group in Mali, with 80% of the population speaking the Bambara language, regardless of ethnicity. 
0.7783 0.8254 
Niger The Djerma, also spelled Zerma, Zarma, Dyerma, or Zaberma, are a people of westernmost Niger and adjacent areas of Burkina 
Faso and Nigeria. The Djerma language is one of the Songhai languages, a branch of the Nilo-Saharan language family. The 
Djerma are considered to be a branch of the Songhai people.  
0.7326 0.6401 
Senegal The Wolof are an ethnic group found in Senegal, The Gambia, and Mauritania. In Senegal, the Wolof form an ethnic plurality with 
about 40% of the population self-identifying as Wolof. They are also the majority in the region stretching from Saint-Louis in the 
north, Kaolack in the south, and Dakar to the west. However, there are few Wolof who reside in Casamance. 
0.7228 0.7695 
Togo The Ewe people are a people of southeastern Ghana, Togo and Benin. They speak the Ewe language and are related to other 
speakers of Gbe languages as the Fon and the Adja of Togo and Benin. They have come to their present territory from the east; 
their original homeland is traced to Oyo in western Nigeria. 
 
0.7107 0.8254 
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Appendix 2: Number of working individuals in the sample with non zero earnings. 
 
  Public sector Private sector Informal sector 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Cotonou 296 115 387 142 1,389 1,881 
Ouagadougou 404 191 260 88 1,534 1,305 
Abidjan 221 85 679 177 1,358 1,543 
Bamako 336 126 389 71 1,462 1,558 
Niamey 427 174 326 95 1,316 978 
Dakar 356 147 738 245 1,760 1,815 
Lome 238 78 250 60 1,252 1,727 
 
Cotonou Sample size Weighted % Niamey Sample size Weighted % 
Fon 2,475 60.3 Djerma 1,542 46.6 
Adja 889 21.5 Haoussa 1,044 32.1 
Dendi 56 1.3 Peul 199 6.1 
Yoa 47 1.1 Touareg 170 5.4 
Yoruba 447 9.9 Kanouri 41 1.2 
Other 295 5.9 Gourma 15 0.5 
Other 253 7.2 
Ouagadougou Sample size Weighted % Missing 31 1.0 
Mossi 2,921 77.2 
Bissa 155 4.1 Dakar Sample size Weighted % 
Bobo 50 1.0 Wolof 2,008 38.1 
Other Manding 168 4.2 Lebou 337 9.1 
Dagari 57 1.4 Serere 747 16.0 
Gourmantche 43 1.2 Diola 278 5.8 
Gourounsi 142 4.1 Manding 191 3.9 
Senoufo 33 0.8 Sarakole 118 2.4 
Peul 73 1.8 Mandjag 115 2.3 
Other 101 3.1 Peul 822 16.0 
Missing 31 1.4 Other 313 6.3 
Abidjan Sample size Weighted % Lome Sample size Weighted % 
Akan 1,278 32.4 Ewe-Mina-Wachi 2,582 71.8 
Krou 444 11.5 Akposso-Akebou 66 1.8 
Mande N 631 16.3 Ana-Ife 109 3.1 
Mande S 171 4.4 Kabye-Tem 467 13.1 
Volta 328 8.2 Para-Gourma-Akan 148 4.2 
Native of Burkina 1,188 26.9 Other Togolese 33 0.8 
Missing 20 0.5 Other Non Togolese 195 5.2 
Bamako Sample size Weighted % 
Bambara 1,382 35.7 
Malinke 660 16.9 
Peul 602 15.6 
Sarakole 445 11.1 
Songhai 123 2.9 
Dogon 163 4.4 
Bobo 115 3.5 
Senoufo 155 3.7 
Arab 57 1.0 
Haoussa 128 2.8 
Missing 98 2.3 
 
